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ABSTRACT 
 
There is no doubt that the privacy of people, the confidentiality of their information, the integrity of 
transaction holding, and the availability of service systems are all essential and any threats in any one of 
these aspects will be costly and could lead to disaster. Thereby securing computer services has been 
considered as a core part of any new development one of which is the clinical information systems. In 
this paper we will discus a security policy model for a clinical information system and investigate 
whether logical languages can represent the principles of this kind of model. We have used three security 
logical languages: the Authorization Specification Language (ASL), a Language for Security Constrains 
on Objects (LaSCO) and Ponder: a Language for Specifying Security and Management Policies for 
Distributed Systems. We will also study whether these principles are sufficient to deal with the case of 
multi-agency services and sharing information with the different agencies such as social services, police 
and education authority.   
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INTRODUCTION 
For economy of expression and to make it easy for readers to link with Anderson’s model, we will 
assume that the clinician is female and the patient male. 
 
A security model for clinical information systems has been proposed by Ross Anderson [1,2] to allow 
the British Medical Association (BMA) to meet security requirements of the electronic patient record 
(EPR) and to be the base of any proposed system claims to operate the EPR. Anderson's model is 
composed of a set of principles based on a statement found in the Good Medical Practice booklet issued 
by the General Medical Council (GMC), which says: 
 
Patients have a right to expect that you will not pass on any personal information, which you 
learn in the course of your professional duties, unless they agree. 
 This raises the following questions. Is a patient/patient’s guardian qualified enough to give consent and 
be aware about all consequences that could accrue in future including security threats? For instance 
some patients consider their clinician’s commands as a part of their treatments and must be obeyed. Are 
ordinary patients usually familiar with how their information could be used in future? Despite his 
guardian’s help, the patient may permit an action that may consequently lead to security threats. For 
example patients with a little knowledge about the abuse of clinical information will assume that to 
reject giving consent is safer. Who is responsible in case a patient died as a result of rejected consent? 
Nevertheless a patient may find himself forced to give a consent that authorizes other agencies to gain 
access to his medical record in order to obtain a particular service: for instance [8] to claim for a 
reimbursement for the cost of a visit to the doctor in US.  There are also many examples in the UK. For 
instance, from your insurance company, you need to complete a form that includes the following part: 
 
I authorize any physician, hospital, or other medical related facility, insurance company, or 
other organization, institution or person, that has any record or knowledge of me or my 
dependents, or our health to disclose, when ever requested to do so by CAN or its 
representatives, any and all such information. A photocopy of this authorization shall be 
considered as effective and valid as the original.       
 
THE PRINCIPLES 
 
Nine principles were defined by Anderson [1,2]. These are given below with comments on obvious 
difficulties in their implementation. 
 
Principle 1: Each identifiable clinical record shall be marked with an access control list naming the 
people or groups of people who may read it and append data to it. The system shall prevent anyone not 
on the access control list from accessing the record in any way. 
 
Principle 2: A clinician may open a record with herself and the patient on the access control list. Where 
a patient has been referred, she may open a record with herself, the patient and the referring clinician(s) 
on the access control list. 
 
The clinician-may-open-record clause in principle 2 makes this principle difficult to be logically 
represented. It can be only understood as the following: a clinician must open a new clinical record 
associated with a new access control list for a patient if the new information appear to be hidden from 
users who already have access to this patient’s clinical record unless this principle is not needed to be 
formally implemented. There should be, at least a measurement/mechanism to find out whether a 
clinician was right by opening/not opening a new medical record for a patient according to her judgment 
about the security level of the new information.    
 
 
Principle 3: One of the clinicians on the access control list must be marked as being responsible. Only 
she may alter the access control list, and only she may add other health care professionals to it. 
 
Let us consider the case where the responsible clinician is the only authorized user to alter the access 
control list for a certain clinical record. For instance she forgets her password or deletes her record from 
the access control list, which means losing access to the access control list of that clinical record. Who is 
going to make the access control list available again?   We may assume that a new access control list has 
to be created for that clinical record to replace the inaccessible one and/or that there will be another 
higher level of security such as system administrator. However this assumption is against the goal of 
principle 3, which is based on the responsible clinician being the highest security level for a certain 
clinical record unless the super authorization (e.g. system administrator) might be made as an exception 
comparable to the accident and emergency staff authorization. The second part of the confusion concerns 
the technical experience of the position of the responsible clinician at network level? Is it operating 
system level, middleware level or application level? Definitely it is going to be impracticable for a 
clinician to manage control on all these levels, so her control will be at one level, which very likely will 
be at the application level. Logically the levels beneath compromise security mechanisms at any higher 
level. For instance the security mechanism from the application level can be bypassed using power 
control of the operating system.     
 
Principle 4: The responsible clinician must notify the patient of the names on his record’s access control 
list when it is opened, of all subsequent additions, and whenever responsibility is transferred. His 
consent must also be obtained, except in emergency or in the case of statutory exemptions. 
 
Principle 5: No one shall have the ability to delete clinical information until the appropriate time period 
has expired. 
 
Principle 6: All accesses to clinical records shall be marked on the record with the subject’s name, as 
well as the date and time. An audit trail must also be kept of all deletions. 
 
Principle 7: Information derived from record A may be appended to record B if and only if B’s access 
control list is contained in A’s. 
 
Principle 8: There shall be effective measures to prevent the aggregation of personal health 
information. In particular, patients must receive special notification if any person whom it is proposed 
to add to their access control list already has access to personal health information on a large number 
of people. 
 
Principle 9: Computer systems that handle personal health information shall have a subsystem that 
enforces the above principles in an effective way. Its effectiveness shall be subject to evaluation by 
independent experts. 
The apparent manual nature of principle 9 makes it unsuitable to be represented by the logical languages. 
For this reason we will assume that it has no part to play in the following sections. 
USING SECURITY LOGICAL LANGUAGES TO REPRESENT ANDERSON’S PRINCIPLES: 
 
Three languages are assessed in turn for their effectiveness in handling Anderson’s principles: ASL, 
LaSCO and Ponder. 
General Definitions: 
 
Some important definitions need to be stated before we start using a logical language to represent a 
security policy: 
Closed Policies (positive Authorizations):  
An access is granted if there is an authorization stating that the user can access the object. 
Open policies (negative Authorizations): 
A user can access any object unless it has been explicitly denied. 
An access control policy is a set of rules defining what is authorized. 
 An access control mechanism is a policy implementation to ensure that all accesses are in accordance 
with the underlying policy. 
 
THE AUTHORIZATION SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE (ASL): 
 
Definitions and an overview: 
 
ASL [3] is a language for expressing the authorization according to access control policies. ASL 
supports a model based on two elements, an object (o) which could be a file or directory in a operating 
system or table in relational database, and an authorized entity who could be a user (U), group (G) or 
roles (R). An authorization policy in ASL is a mapping that maps 4-tuples (o, u, R, a) to the set {+, -}, 
where o is an object, u is a user, R is a role and a is an action, while + means authorized and - means 
denied. 
  
ASL is designed principally to express the following rules: 
 
Authorization Rules: used by the System Security Officer (SSO) to allow or deny accesses to objects 
explicitly in the following form: 
cando(o, s, <sign>a) ← L1& …. &Ln 
This predicate symbol states that a subject s can (Positive authorization sign = "+") or cannot (negative 
authorization sign = "-") perform the action a on the object o under the conditions specified by L1& 
..&Ln. L 1 ,…, Ln could be one of the following literals: in, dirin or typeof.  Principle 1 in the following 
section is an example of this rule. 
Derivation Rules: used to derive implicit authorizations from explicit authorizations and determine the 
authorization policy. Indeed it is for expressing propagation of authorization along a subject’s 
hierarchies. In addition derivation rules can express some kinds of implication relationships such as the 
derivation of an authorization in the base of the presence or the absence of other authorizations. The 
derivation rule has the following form: 
dercando(o, s, <sign>a) ←  L1& …. &Ln 
The right hand side of this rule derives a positive or negative authorization The outcome is determined 
by <sign>) for a subject s to perform the action a on the object o according to another authorization in 
the right hand side (L1& …&Ln  ). L1 ,…, Ln could be one of the following literals: cando, dercando, 
done, do, in, dirin or typeof.  
 
Resolution Rules: used to regulate how to resolve any conflict could accrue between authorizations 
specified by the authorization rules cando and dercando as in the following form: 
do(o, s, <sign>a) ← L1& …. &Ln 
This form states the enforcement of exercising (if sign = +) or forbidding  (if sign = -) an access on an 
object by a subject s in the case of  a conflict in the Authorization rules (cando or dercando) in the right 
hand side.   
 
Access Control Rules: to be used to regulate access control decisions on the basis of authorization 
specified by the authorization rules. 
Access control rules have the following form: 
grant(o, u, rs, <sign>a) ← L1& …. &Ln 
This form states that a request submitted by a user u with active roles R to perform the action a will be 
allowed (sign = +) or forbidden (sign = -) based on an authorization condition on the right hand side 
L1& …. &Ln. L1& …. &Ln are either cando, dercando, done, do, in, dirin, or typeof   
 
Integrity Rules: used to express different kinds of constraints on the specifications and the use of 
authorizations. An integrity rule is of the form: 
error()← L1& …. &Ln 
where L1& …. &Ln are either cando, dercando, done, do, in, dirin, or typeof   This rule derives an error 
every time the conditions in the right hand side of the rules are satisfied. 
 
Using the authorization language (ASL) for specifying the clinical security principles: 
 
Principle 1: 
A subject s can read from and write on a clinical record clincal_record if and only if she is in the access 
control list Clinical_Record_ACL (here specified as a role) of that record. 
The following is simply an authorization rule. The left hand side part (cando(clincal_record, s, 
+read/write)) is the authorization that is to be given and the right hand side part (in(s, 
Clinical_Record_ACL)) is specifying conditions that must be verified for the authorization to be granted.  
 
← cando(clincal_record, s, +read/write) ← in(s, Clinical_Record_ACL) 
 
 
 
Principles 3 and 4: 
The following code states that a subject patient must read his access control list Clinical_Record_ACL if 
it has been appended by a subject clinician who is authorized to do so  
 
←  cando(Clinical_Record_ACL, clinician, +append) ← do(Clinical_Record_ACL , patient, +read) 
←  cando (Clinical_Record_ACL , patient, +read)   ←  done (Clinical_Record_ACL, clinician, append) 
← cando (Clinical_Record_ACL, clinician, +append) 
 
Observations: 
 
ASL is a language for expressing the authorization in matter of allowing or denying an access to an 
object. There is no way to express consequent actions that should be carried out after some authorized 
access such as auditing operations (e.g. principle 6). In addition it is not clear in this language how to 
express authorization restricted by the number of accesses as is needed for controlling the aggregate 
access problem (e.g. principle 8). 
 
A LANGUAGE FOR SECURITY CONSTRAINTS ON OBJECTS (LaSCO): 
 
An overview: 
 
LsSCO [4] is based on a model where a system consists of objects and events. The attributes on an event 
denote the specifics of the event’s execution. Policies in LaSCO are stated as policy graphs which 
describe a specific state of the system (domain) and specific access constraints (requirements). 
Predicates are annotations near the nodes (objects) and the edges (events) to describe the domains (in the 
graph written as bold text. For example Type="user" and Method="access" in figure 1 are 
descriptions of domains. Requirements are written in the graph as normal text, for example $UID ∈ 
ACL. LaSCO uses variables called policy variables. A policy variable represents a value of an attribute 
and relates attribute values associated with different objects and events. Variables may appear as 
operands in domains (e.g. in figure 1 ID=$UID) and in requirement predicates (e.g. in figure 1 $UID ∈ 
ACL). They are denoted by a “$” prefix. 
 
Using LaSCO to describe the clinical security principles: 
 
Principle 1: 
The policy graph in figure 1 indicates that a user/subject needs to have his/her/it ID represented by the 
policy variable $UID included in the access control list of the clinical record in order to have an access 
to it, that is $UID ∈ ACL.   
 Figure 1: a security policy graph to represent principle 1 of the clinical security policy. 
 
Principle 2: 
If the user’s security level/clearance, represented by the policy variable $UL, is not the same as the 
clinical record’s security level, represented by another policy variable $FL, a clinician may create a new 
clinical record with the new access control list as shown in figure 2.  The requirement is that the security 
levels are different ($UL ≠ $FL). 
 
 
Figure 2: a security policy graph to represent principle 2 of the clinical security policy. 
 
Principle 3: 
The policy graph in figure 3 states that a user, represented as an object, which is stated by a set of 
attributes type and position in addition to policy variable $ID, can only append the access control list for 
a clinical record if she is marked as responsible clinician. The event is represented in the policy graph as 
a method with value "append".  The domain is represented as an object, which is stated by a set of 
attributes type and name. The requirement is that the ID of that user has to be the value of the attribute 
called responsible_clinician. 
  
 
Figure 3: a security policy graph to represent principle 3 of the clinical security policy. 
 
 
 
Principle 4: 
Since principle 4 includes two events under different restrictions, we will divide it into two principles. 
Principle 4a considers the part that says the responsible clinician must notify the patient of all 
subsequent additions to the names on his record’s access control list when it is opened. Principle 4b 
considers the part that says, whenever responsibility is transferred, the Patient’s consent must also be 
obtained, except in emergency or in the case of statutory exemptions. 
 
Principle 4a: 
The policy graph in figure 4 specifies the first part of principle 4 by restricting the method add to be 
executed after the method message. Both add and message are events and the restriction is ensured by a 
security requirement that enforces the order of these two events (Time > $ST). So adding a new user to 
the access control list will not be allowed until a message is sent to the patient containing the name of 
the user who it is proposed to add to the access control list of his clinical record. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: a security policy graph to represent the first part of principle 4 of the clinical security policy. 
 
Principle 4b: 
The policy graph in figure 5 specifies the second part of principle 4 as following:  the event change 
responsibility is restricted by either the case is an emergency or the other event Name="Consent" && 
Permit=$PM has been performed and the consent has been given, that is  $PM=true || 
Case="emergency". 
 
 
Figure 5: a security policy graph to represent the second part of principle 4 of the clinical security policy. 
 
Principle 5:  
The policy graph that is shown in figure 6 states that event delete can he called by a subject to delete a 
clinical record object if and only if the system date $sysdate, a policy variable, is grater than or equal to 
the expiry date of that clinical record $Edate, another Policy variable. 
 
Figure 6: a security policy graph to represent principle 5 of the clinical security policy. 
 
Principle 6: 
The policy graph that is shown in figure 7 specifies principle 6 by ensuring that a log record to be created 
contains a subject id ($SID), the access date and time ($DT), the access id ($ADID), and the accessed 
clinical record ($RID) for any access to the clinical record instance. 
 
Figure7: a security policy graph to represent principle 6 of the clinical security policy. 
 
Principle 7:  
The policy graph that is shown in figure 8 represents the information flow control by ensuring that the 
access control list for the source record is a subset of the access control list of the destination record, that 
is $ACL_B ∈  $ACL_A.    
 
Note that: this principle is also implicitly shown in principle 1 representation 
  
  
Figure 8: a security policy graph to represent principle 7 of the clinical security policy. 
 
Principle 8: 
The policy graph, shown in figure 9, states that adding a new user to the access control list of a patient’s 
medical record is not allowed before a message is sent to the patients. This message informs them that 
the user who it is proposed to add to their access control list already has access to personal health 
information on a large number of people such that NoA > n. NoA is the number of accesses for the 
proposed user and n is a constant. 
Note that the order of the two events is enforced by ensuring that the time of the add method is greater 
than the time of message method, that is Time > $ST. 
 
 
Figure 9: a security policy graph to represent principle 8 of the clinical security policy. 
 
 
A LANGUAGE FOR SPECIFYING SECURITY AND MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR 
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS (PONDER): 
 
Definitions and an overview: 
 
Ponder [5] is a declarative and object-oriented language that includes constructs for specifying the 
following basic policy types: 
 
o Authorization policies specify what activities a subject is permitted or forbidden to do. In other 
words specifying either positive (auth+) and negative (auth+) authorization policies is possible. 
Principle 1 in the following section is represented as a positive authorization while principle 5 is 
an example of the negative authorization. 
o Obligation policies specify what activities a subject must do. These policies are triggered by 
events and are usually interpreted by a manager agent. An example of this type is found in 
principle 2.  
o Refrain policies define actions that subjects must refrain from performing. 
o Delegation policies define what authorizations can be delegated and to whom. 
o Composed policies are used to define a syntactic scope for specifying a set of related policies. 
There are four types of composed policies: groups, roles, relationships and structure 
management. 
o Meta policies specify a permitted value for a valid policy. 
 
The reader of this paper will note in the following section that all Anderson’s principles fall into 
two types of security policies, authorization policies and obligation policies because these 
principles attempt to restrict the access control and/or enforce consequential actions such as the 
auditing process. 
 
Using the Ponder language to describe the clinical security principles: 
 
Principle 1: 
A subject s of type user is authorized to read and/or append the clinical record r if and only if s is in the 
access control list of the clinical record r.ACL where r.ACL is the access control of the clinical record r.  
Note that type is a type definition introducing a new user-defined policy type from which one or more 
policy instances of that type can be created, auth+ is a reserved word indicating that the following is a 
positive authorization policy and principle1 the name of the policy type. subject<user> s means that s is 
a subject of type user, target <clinicalRecord> r means that r is the target object of type clinical Record 
to be accessed by the subject s. action is a reserved word followed by the action, read and append, that 
is needed to be authorized. belongs is a user defined function to check whether the subject s is a member 
of the access control list of the record r. If so the positive authorisation will be allowed, that is result = 
enable; 
 
type  
        auth+ principle1 (subject <user>  s, target <clinicalRecord> r) 
{ 
   action read, append if belongs(s, r.ACL)  
        {  
            result = enable;  
        } 
  } 
 
Principle 2: 
In the case of new clinical information for a patient NewInformation appears to be in a different security 
level isDifferentSecLevel. From the existing access control list currClinicalRecordAcl a new access 
control list newClinicalRecordAcl has to be created  
Note that on is a reserved word followed by the obligation condition, and isDifferentSecLevel is a user-
defined function to compare the new information against the current security level and check whether it 
is a different security level. In this case the mandatory action has to be performed, that is do 
createNewACL(newClinicalRecordAcl)).  
 
 
type 
    oblig principle2 (subject <responsible_clinician> s,  
                                target <ACL> currClinicalRecordAcl, newClinicalRecordAcl,   
                                           <ClincalData> newInformation) 
              { 
                on isDifferentSecLevel (currClinicalRecordAcl, NewInformation); 
                do createNewACL(newClinicalRecordAcl));  
               } 
 
Principle 3: 
A subject s of type clinician is authorized to alter and/or append the access control list of a clinical 
record clinicalRecordAcl if and only if s is marked as a responsible user in the access control list.  
 
type  
        auth+ principle3 (subject <clinician>  s, target <ACL> clinicalRecordAc) 
                { 
                  action alter, append  
                  if position(s, clinicalRecordAcl) = "responsible" 
                                  { 
                                    result = enable;  
                                   } 
     } 
 
Principle 4: 
This principle is divided into two parts the first principle 4a concerns informing the patient about any 
new addition to his clinical record access control list via the responsible clinician. This part is 
represented as follows: in case of adding new record addNew to a patient’s access control list of his 
clinical record clinicalRecordAcl, then that patient has to be informed through the action informPatient. 
 type 
    oblig principle4a (subject <responsible_clinician> s,  
                                  target <ACL> clinicalRecordAcl, clinician newName) 
                { 
                  on addNew (newName, clinicalRecordAcl); 
                  do informPatient (newName);  
                 } 
 
The second part of this principle (principle 4b) deals with the case of changing the responsibilities in the 
access control list of the clinical records. This part is represented as follows: a subject s of type 
responsible clinician will be authorized to change the responsibilities in the access control list of a 
patient clinical record if and only if he has obtained that patient’s consent.     
 
type 
    auth+ principle4b (subject <responsible_clinician> s,  target <ACL> clinicalRecordAcl) 
               { 
                 action changeResponsibility  if PatientConsent (clinician,  newResponsibility)=true  
                                        { 
          result = enable;   
    } 
                 } 
 
 
Principle 5: 
A subject s cannot delete clinical record r until this record has expired, that is todayDate() > 
expiryDate(r). 
Note that when is called the authorization filter and is used to restrict an action by a given condition. 
 
type 
        auth- principle5 (subject s, target<clinicalRecord> r) 
                  {  
                    action delete; 
                     when todayDate() > expiryDate(r); 
                   } 
 
 
Principle 6: 
An audit record contains the subject identifier s, date aDate and time aTime of action, type of action 
aType, and the record that has been accessed r. All accesses on the clinical record r by a subject s must 
be recorded. 
 
type 
     oblig principle4 (subject s, target <clinicalRecord> r) 
          { 
           on allAccess (s, aDate, aTime, aType, r); 
           do createAuditRecord (s, aDate, aTime, aType);  
            } 
 
Principle 7: 
Transferring data from clinical record A to clinical record B is not allowed unless all records in the 
access control list of b clinicalRecordAcl_B are included in the access control list of a 
clinicalRecordAcl_A. 
 
type 
        auth- principle7 (clinicalRecord A, <ACL> clinicalRecordAcl_A,  
                                     <ACL> clinicalRecordAcl_B, target<clinicalRecord> B)  
{  
 action transfer(a.data, b.data); 
 when List(clinicalRecordAcl_B) in List(clinicalRecordAcl_A) 
} 
 
Principle 8: 
In the case of adding a new record which grants a new user access to a clinical record through a patient 
access control list, then the patient has to be informed of the number of records to which the new user 
has access. 
type 
    oblig principle8 (subject <responsible_clinician> s,  
                                target <ACL> clinicalRecordAcl, clinician newName) 
              { 
                 on addNew (newName, clinicalRecordAcl); 
                 do informPatient (newName, getNoAccess(newName));  
              } 
COMPARISONS: 
  
Although all the above languages are basically targeting the specification of security polices, they focus 
on different aspects. For instance ASL focuses more on the access control policies and LaSCO attempts 
to express constraints on objects, while Ponder aims to specify security and management policies for 
distributed systems. Additionally they are different from the language’s character point of view. Whereas 
ASL is based on logic and LaSCO policies are specified as logical expressions and as directed graphs, 
Ponder is a declarative language inheriting its syntax from the OCL "Object Constrain Language". 
According to the nature of each one of these languages we have found that some of Anderson’s 
principles are not directly representable. For example principles such as those dealing with auditing 
operations (e.g. principle 6) and control aggregation problems (e.g. principle 8) were not representable at 
all by ASL and could be only indirectly expressed by LaSCO. On the other hand Ponder was more 
suitable for these kinds of principles since Ponder has got forms to deal with the management polices. 
Table 1 illustrates the comparison between these three languages according to their ability to express 
Anderson’s clinical security principles. 
 
Languages 
 
Principles 
 
ASL 
 
LaSCO 
 
Ponder 
Principle 1 Explicitly represented Explicitly represented  Explicitly represented  
Principle 2 Not applicable Indirectly represented Indirectly represented 
Principle 3 Indirectly represented Explicitly represented  Explicitly represented  
Principle 4 Indirectly represented Indirectly represented Explicitly represented  
Principle 5 Not applicable Explicitly represented  Explicitly represented  
Principle 6 Not applicable Indirectly represented Explicitly represented  
Principle 7 Not applicable Explicitly represented  Explicitly represented  
Principle 8 Not applicable Indirectly represented Explicitly represented  
Principle 9 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
 
Table 1: Comparison table shows how far ASL, LaSCO and Ponder language can represent Anderson’s 
principles.  
 
MULTI-AGENCY SERVICES ENVIRONMENT AND COLLABORATION ISSUE 
 
Only limited forms of cross-organizational access control were considered by Anderson [1,2]. Such 
aspects include principle 4 that requires informing the patient about any addition to his record access 
control list and principle 6 concerning the auditing aspects. In general the issue of sharing clinical 
information including collaboration activities with other agencies such as police, social services or the 
education authority were not clearly considered [7]. One possible reason could be that these principles 
were derived from a centralized system viewpoint at least from the responsibilities and ownership point 
of view. 
NEED-TO-KNOW PROBLEM 
 
Need-to-know was not included in Anderson’s model, as the BMA does not accept that ’need-to-know’ is 
an acceptable basis for access control decisions. Further details may be found in [1,2]. However there 
might be a case where the need-to-know cannot be avoided. For instance a service provider such as 
social services offers its services conditioned by some information about the patient who applies for such 
services. There are two major problems in this case. Firstly who is authorized to decide about who needs 
to know in a multi-agency services environment where responsibilities are distributed. Secondly how can 
we resolve the conflict between the patient’s consent and the need-to-know? Further investigation will 
take place to find out whether the mandatory need-to-know exists. Since there is no need-to-know 
without a task, we propose an approach based on associating the data with tasks and granting these tasks 
to performers rather than giving direct authorization to the secret data. The task could be in the form of 
an agreement between the information’s owner and who needs to know (task’s performer). This 
agreement would consist of full awareness about the task that requires the information, information size, 
release time, time of expiry and a guarantee to restrict the use of this information to the specified task. 
We shall explain this approach and need-to-know problem in detail in another report.  
It is important to note that there does exist work considering a task-based access-control model in 
general terms [9] 
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
 
Anderson in his papers [1,2] argues that a security solution is an issue requiring great care to ensure that 
the security mechanisms work together rather than operate independently. Although some professionals 
in health care information technology believe that any implementation of Anderson's principles would be 
expensive to implement and unmanageable to maintain, others such as Denley and Smith [6] according 
to their experience in the implementation of these principles in three British hospitals: Conquest 
Hospital, Aintree Hospital and Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital, state that Anderson's principles can be 
applied to the electronic patient record to maximise privacy. However, the CEN (Europe Committee for 
Standardization) group  [10] observes that Anderson’s model is specified at too high a level for practical 
purposes and is not provable complete because it is neither precise nor exhaustive. Cohen [11] has 
proposed a formal model, complementary to Anderson’s, which is again not accepted by the CEN group 
because it is not shown to be complete and because it is not based on basic security properties.  
Our work contributes to the solution of the clinical information systems security problem by discussing 
Anderson’s security model for the clinical information systems and examining logically the principles of 
this model by representing them using some selected languages for specifying security policies.  
The ease with which the principles can be represented in a logical framework varies considerably. For 
example principles such as those dealing with auditing operations and control aggregation problems 
were not representable at all by ASL and could be only indirectly expressed by LaSCO. On the other 
hand Ponder was more suitable for these kinds of principles since Ponder has got forms to deal with the 
management polices. 
Anderson's principles are mainly applicable to centralized systems. There were no precise principles in 
this model concerning either the multi-agency services environment or the need-to-know problem. The 
latter was not rated of high priority by the BMA. We consider that a task-based approach is promising in 
developing a need-to-know policy. Other aspects of security in multi-agency services   are still being 
investigated. CEN [10] also plan to broaden the model of security in healthcare to include all the 
potential needs of the different participants.  
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